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CASES NOTED
CONTEMPT OF TRIAL COURT-EFFECT OF APPEAL
The plaintiff initiated a paternity suit in' chancery.' The jury re-
turned a verdict against the defendant and the court ordered a schedule
of support payments.' The defendant filed an appeal but did not remit
any of the court-ordered payments or post a supersedeas bond.' The
plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the defendant
had been adjudged in contempt" by the trial court for disregarding its
order to pay support.5 Held, dismissed: when an appellant has been ad-
judged in contempt of a lower court for violating its order in the cause
appealed from, then the appellate court may dismiss the appeal without
considering the merits of the decision of the court below. Morris v. Rabara,
145 So.2d 265 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
It is well settled that when an appellant disobeys an appellate court
order, his appeal will be dismissed.6 When an appellant disobeys a trial
court order, however, the decisions are not uniform with respect to dis-
posal of a subsequent appeal. Some jurisdictions have dismissed the
appeal 7 whereas others have permitted it,8 and a few states have con-
flicting results within their own courts.' Florida cannot be considered to
1. FLA. STAT. § 742.011 (1961) states: "Any unmarried woman who shall be pregnant
or delivered of a bastard child, may bring proceedings in the circuit court, in chancery,
to determine the paternity of such child."
2. FLA. STAT. § 742.031 (1961), provides for a trial by jury on the issue of paternity
and empowers the chancellor to order support payments.
3. FLA. STAT. § 59.13(1) (1961), provides for the setting and posting of supersedeas bond
in order to stay the execution of the lower court's decree while an appeal is pending.
4. In addition appellee moved to strike appellant's brief for failure to include any
part of the original transcript in the appendix and also moved to quash and affirm,
claiming the appeal was frivolous. Both motions were denied for being without merit.
The shotgun use of these motions indicates that counsel for appellee may have inadvertently
stumbled upon what turned out to be the deciding factor in this case. Morris v. Rabara 145
So. 2d 265, 266 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
5. The appellee's first motion to dismiss was denied because the appellant had not
yet failed to meet the court-ordered schedule of payments. The court said that the "record
here does not demonstrate that the defendant is in contempt." Ibid.
6. E.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 91 Ariz. 356, 372 P.2d 697 (1962); Creel v. Creel, 29
So.2d 838 (Miss. 1947); Larkin v. Larkin, 192 Okla. 144, 134 P.2d 590 (1943).
7. E.g., Casebolt v. Butler, 175 Ky. 381, 194 S.W. 305 (1917); Closset v. Closset,
71 Nev. 80, 280 P.2d 290 (1955); Flakal Corp. v. Krause, 269 Wis. 310, 70 N.W.2d 8 (1955).
8. E.g., Aderholt v. Aderholt, 218 Miss. 808, 67 So.2d 505 (1953); Hazard v. Durant,
11 R.I. 195 (1875); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 120 W. Va. 389, 198 S.E. 209 (1938).
9. California held dismissal to be proper in MacPherson v. MacPherson, 13 Cal. 2d 271,
89 P.2d 382 (1939) ; Knoob v. Knoob, 192 Cal. 95, 218 Pac. 568 (1923). But California held
dismissal improper in Borenstein v. Borenstein, 11 Cal. 2d 255, 79 P.2d 91 (1938); Hosford v.
Henry, 107 Cal. App. 2d 765, 238 P.2d 91 (1951). Illinois has held dismissal to be proper
in Garrett v. Garrett, 341 Ill. 232, 173 N.E. 107 (1930); Lindsay v. Lindsay, 255 11M. 442,
99 N.E. 608 (1912). It was held improper in People v. Horton, 46 Ill. App. 434 (1892).
CASES NOTED
have conflicting decisions since dismissal is discretionary with the appel-
late court. 10
The contempt-appeal" cases arise most often from domestic rela-
tions disputes involving alimony, support payments and child custody. 2
When the case law in this area is analyzed according to factual situations
involved, a distinct pattern can be discerned. The overwhelming majority
of the states which dismiss contempt-appeal cases do so only when the
appellant has purposely left the jurisdiction of the court or has caused a
child, whose custody is in dispute, to do so. The rationale for dismissing
these appeals is that the court has lost its power to enforce its final de-
cision' 8 and has lost power to punish contempt through fine or incarcera-
tion." The courts which dismiss appeals of fugitive appellants are unlikely
to do so unless contempt proceedings have begun in the court below.' 5
In National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Arnold 6 the United
States Supreme Court held that a state court's action in dismissing a
contempt-appeal did not violate the "due process" clause of the fourteenth
amendment because appeal is not a right granted by the Constitution.',
The high tribunal relied upon the reasoning used by the courts in criminal-
appeal cases, in which there exists a long-standing precedent of dismissing
appeals of fugitives. 8
10. The Florida court did not dismiss the appeal in Palmer v. Palmer, 28 Fla. 295,
9 So. 657 (1891) but it did not state that it was without power to do so. The instant
case indicated that dismissal is within the judicial discretion of the appellate court.
11. Hereinafter the term contempt-appeal will refer to civil cases in which an appel-
lant is disobeying a trial court order while the appeal is pending.
12. E.g., McHan v. McHan, 59 Idaho 41, 80 P.2d 29 (1938) (alimony); Stewart v.
Stewart, 91 Ariz. 356, 372 P.2d 697 (1962) (support payments); Burns v. Burns, 35 Il.
App. 2d 34, 181 N.E.2d 605 (1962) (custody).
13. E.g., MacPherson v. MacPherson, 13 Cal. 2d 271, 89 P.2d 382 (1939) (appellant
went to Mexico) ; Lindsay v. Lindsay, 255 I1. 442, 99 N.E. 608 (1912). These cases generally
follow the rationale used in criminal fugitive dismissals-that when a party is without
the court's jurisdiction he may choose to accept the court's decision by returning or reject
an unfavorable decision by remaining a fugitive. Because of this "option" in the appellant,
these courts have refused to hear the appeal. It is suggested that the "full faith and credit"
clause limits this "option" in the appellant since the final decision of the appellate court
can be executed in other states within the United States.
14. Fine and imprisonment are standard devices used for coercing compliance to a
court order. They are also used as a means of punishing contempt when the courts find
this necessary. THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 4 (1934).
15. Hosford v. Henry, 107 Cal. App. 2d 765, 238 P.2d 91 (1951); Palmer v. Palmer,
28 Fla. 295, 9 So. 657 (1891); Ruhl v. Ruhl, 24 W. Va. 279 (1884). Contra, Tobin v. Casaus,
128 Cal. App. 2d 588, 275 P.2d 792 (1954). These cases discuss the possibility of violating
the "due process" clause of the Constitution by denying an appeal before contempt is
adjudged.
16. 348 U.S. 37 (1954). In this case the appellant failed to make payments on a
money judgment and failed to post bond in lieu thereof. He was adjudged in contempt
and his appeal dismissed.
17. The court pointed out that statutory review is important and must be exercised
without discrimination, but that it is not a requirement of due process. Id. at 43. The
"right of appeal [is not] essential to due process." Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 508
(1903).
18. Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1896); Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876).
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The predominant rationale of courts which refuse to dismiss con-
tempt-appeal cases is that appeal is a right which should not be interfered
with when there are alternative methods of punishing for contempt. 9
The factual pattern that most frequently emerges in this area of contempt-
appeal cases concerns an appellant who has failed to make payments
ordered by the court, yet remains in its jurisdiction. Generally, the courts
do not dismiss these appeals because they may, by use of coercive meth-
ods, achieve compliance with the lower court's order. °
In Woodson v. State,2 decided in 1882, Florida adopted the pro-
cedure in criminal cases of dismissing appeals of fugitive appellants. The
court reasoned that it should not spend its time entertaining proceedings
when the successful execution of its judgment remained subject to the
inclination of the fugitive.22 The instant case cites Woodson and Bronk
v. Bronk28 with approval. The Bronk case, a divorce action, dealt with
an appellant who escaped from the sheriff's custody in order to avoid a
writ of ne exeat 4 In denying the appellant's right to be heard on five
counts of his appeal the court said:
The right to be heard upon appeal or writ of error has not been
held to be one which a party can not deprive himself of by his
voluntary act of putting himself in contempt of court .... The
court will not ... determine the correctness of the action of the
lower court ... while the appellant, in defiance of the court and
of its writs, remains beyond its jurisdiction and renders it
powerless to enforce any decree . . . it might render. 5
The only other Florida civil case in this area, Palmer v. Palmer,2 6
did not give a precise ruling on dismissal of a contempt-appeal; rather,
it held that it was not proper to dismiss an appeal when contempt was not
formally adjudged.
The court in the instant case admitted that it had no precedent
The court analogized between the Arnold case and criminal cases, suggesting that in these
situations the "subject matter of litigation" is no longer in the courts jurisdiction. See note
16 supra at 43.
19. Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409 (1896); McHan v. McHan, 59 Idaho 41, 80 P.2d
29 (1938); National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37 (1954)
(dissent).
20. THomAs, op. cit. supra note 14.
21. 19 Fla. 549 (1882).
22. See note 13, supra..
23. 46 Fla. 474, 35 So. 870 (1903).
24. "A writ which forbids the person to whom it is addressed to leave . . . the juris-
diction of the court. . . . Sometimes . . . it is issued against a person who is removing
or attempting to remove property beyond the jurisdiction." BLAcx, LAW DICTIONARY (4th
ed. 1951).
25. Bronk v. Bronk, 46 Fla. 474, 476-77; 35 So. 870, 871 (1903).
26. 28 Fla. 295, 9 So. 657 (1891).
27. There must be a hearing on a rule to show cause why a party should not be
adjudged in contempt before he is thus adjudged. Palmer v. Palmer, 36 Fla. 385, 18 So.
720 (1895).
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"1precisely in point"2 for deciding civil contempt-appeal cases. The de-
cision adopted one of the prevailing reasons for dismissal when it stated
that "it is contrary to the principles of justice to permit one who has
flounted [sic] the orders of the court to demand judicial assistance." 9
The instant case places Florida with the majority of states, which dismiss
appeals when the appellants voluntarily absent themselves from the court's
jurisdiction.8" However, the court's rationale indicates that Florida may
go beyond this position and dismiss any action8 in which the appellant
has flouted the orders of the court. The court reduces the harsh impact 2
of the dismissal to a degree by allowing the appellant thirty days to
purge himself of contempt. This provision, which has become common
in similar cases,88 is a significant benefit to the appellant who is not wil-
fully in contempt or who .is able to purge himself of contempt without
undue hardship.
The Florida Constitution grants the right of appeal in all cases.84
The courts have the power to punish for contempt so that the judicial
system will not become meaningless because of disrespect for and dis-
obedience of its orders.8, The Morris case places the court in a dilemma
between these two important principles. It is submitted that the constitu-
tional right to appeal should be zealously guarded by the courts and
that the more equitable solution would be to stay the appeal until the
appellant purges himself of contempt, allowing him thirty days without
cause and one year with cause. " Since the Morris case was at the district
court level it is hoped that when similar facts reach the Florida Supreme
Court, it will see fit to solve this dilemma by protecting the right of appeal.
DONALD I. BIERMAN
28. Morris v. Rabara, 145 So.2d 265, 267 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
29. Ibid.
30. "[T]he judgment of contempt has not been executed for the reason that the defendant
cannot be found in Palm Beach County." Id. at 266 (emphasis added.) See cases cited
note 13 supra.
31. A California court dismissed the appeal of a party who was a fugitive in a case
totally different from the one at bar because the court said he was flaunting the judicial
system. In re Scott's Estate, 150 Cal. App. 2d 590, 310 P.2d 46 (1957).
32. Dismissal of appeal differs from other coercive methods of the court in that once
an appeal is dismissed it is lost forever, whereas with other means of coercion the party
may be relieved of punishment by complying with the court order.
33. E.g., Burns v. Burns, 35 Ill. App. 2d 34, 181 N.E.2d 605 (1962) (30 days); Hen-
derson v. Henderson, 329 Mass. 257, 107 N.E.2d 773 (1952) (30 days); White v. White,
132 N.Y. Supp. 1043, 148 App. Div. 883 (1911) (10 days).
34. Appeals from trial courts in each appellate district . . . may be taken to the
court of appeal of such district, as a matter of right, from all final judgments or
decrees except those from which appeals may be taken directly to the supreme court
or to a circuit court. FLA. CONST. art V, § 5(3). (Emphasis added.)
35. FA. STAT. § 38.23 (1961) provides that the courts shall be empowered to punish
for contempt. The refusal to obey a court order or decree is specifically mentioned as
contempt.
36. This is similar to the rule dealing with default judgments and decrees pro confesso.
FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.38 (b).
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